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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
certainty that dividends shall not be paid except from surplus.43
It cannot be denied that such statutory policy of dividend restric-
tion is intended primarily for protection of creditors.
There is no need for future Louisiana litigation to shoot judicial
rapids experienced in other states, replete with confusing and
conflicting theories of shareholders' liability. Preventive legisla-
tion is desirable. An amendment to Subdivision II of Section 27
of the Louisiana Corporation Act, allowing the creditors, in ad-
dition to the corporation, a direct action against shareholders to
recover illegal dividends, regardless of the good faith of the
shareholder, solvency of the corporation, or position of the credi-
tor's claim in relation to the declaration of the dividend, would
insure the basic relationships of both creditors and shareholders
and uphold the clear statutory policy of dividend restrictions.
44
A very brief prescriptive period for this action would relieve the
shareholder of a long period of uncertainty, which has been the
touchstone of so many decisions allowing the good faith stock-
holder to retain a clearly illegal dividend.
45
Subdivision III of Section 27 of the Louisiana Corporation
Act provides that directors who are held liable "for the sole rea-
son of having acted negligently" shall have a right of action over
against each shareholder for the proportionate amount of the
illegal dividend, distribution, payment or return of assets re-
ceived by the shareholder. This excellent provision in our cor-
poration law has been highly commended as an appropriate
statutory method of reimbursing merely negligent directors who
should not be made to stand this burden for such a minor mis-
feasance.46
WILLIAM F. WILSON, JR.
CORPORATIONS: SHAREHOLDER RATIFICATION OF
DIRECTORS' ACTION
It often happens that the board of directors of a corporation
authorizes an unenforceable transaction. Such transactions are
unenforceable because they are either ultra vires, voidable, or
43. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 26(I) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1106(I)].
44. Ballantine, Corporations (1946) 601, § 255. "The true basis of liability
(of the shareholder) is neither the trust fund theory nor a fraudulent con-
veyance theory, but the enforcement of the statutory policy of dividend re-
strictions and the questions of what remedies are practical and just for the
purpose of protecting all parties concerned."
45. See note 30, supra.
46. Briggs, Stockholders' Liability for Unlawful Dividends (1934) 8
Temple L. Q. 145, 184.
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illegal. The scope of this article is to determine which of these
transactions may be subsequently ratified' by the shareholders
at a duly constituted meeting and what proportionate vote is
necessary to accomplish the ratification.
Ultra Vires Transactions
With regard to ultra vires transactions the authorities are in
a state of hopeless confusion. "The situation is such that the law
in any given state can be determined, if at all, only by a minute
examination of the local decisions."'2 Much of the conflict is at-
tributable to the loose definitions of ultra vires transactions.3
Some courts consider an ultra vires act to be one which the cor-
poration has no power to perform; 4 others look upon it as an act
which is legal in its inception, but beyond the authority of the
corporation to perform.5
The courts committed to the lack of power doctrine consider
an ultra vires transaction invalid hence incapable of ratification
even by the unanimous assent of the shareholders. 7 Notwithstand-
ing the inability of the shareholders to ratify the transaction and
1. This comment will be limited as much as possible to formal ratifica-
tion by the shareholders, and estoppel will be considered only incidentally.
2. 2 Machem, Modern Law of Corporations (1908) § 1021.
3. "Possibly there is no term in the whole law used as loosely and with
so little regard to its strict meaning as the term 'ultra vires.' Unfortunately
this expression has been used by the courts and by the writers on corpora-
tion law as meaning several things, and this has resulted in much confu-
sion." 7 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (perm. ed. 1931) § 3399.
4. Savannah Ice Co. v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 12 Ga. App.
818, 79 S. E. 45 (1913). Cf. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Aleman Planting
& Mfg. Co., 166 La. 457, 117 So. 554 (1928).
5. Stevens v. Boyes Hot Springs Co., 113 Cal. App. 479, 298 Pac. 508 (1931).
6. Pattison v. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n, 360 Ill. 616, 196 N. E. 882,
affirming 278 Ill. App. 394 (1935) (writing of a policy of insurance beyond
the statutory powers) where the court said, "Whether a corporation is
estopped to set up the defense of ultra vires depends upon whether the
acts are beyond the purposes or powers of the corporation. If the power
to make such contract is entirely wanting there could be no power to
ratify it, and such attempted contract could not be given vitality by the
acts of the parties under it." In re New State Life Ins. Co., 164 Okla. 208,
23 P.(2d) 376 (1933) (insurance company advanced large sums of its stock-
holders' money to another insurance company); Tilden v. Barber, 268 Fed.
587 (D. C. N. J. 1920) (dummy directors voting bonds and stocks to pro-
moters for over-valued consideration); Edward Hines Western Pine Co. v.
First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 61 F.(2d) 503 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932) (purchase of
promissory notes wherein the corporation had no interest).
7. Savannah Ice Co. v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 12 Ga. App.
818, 826, 79 S. E. 45, 50 (1913), where the court said, "But we prefer to base
our decision upon the broader ground that the consent of all the stock-
holders will not estop the corporation from challenging the legality of an
act which is wholly beyond the scope of its charter powers." Piedmont
Feed & Grocery Co. v. Georgia Feed & Grocery Co., 52 Ga. App. 847, 184
S.E. 899 (1935); Ashbury Ry. Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche, L.R. 7 H.L.
(E. & I. App.) 653, 33 L.T.(N.S.) 450 (1875); Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101
U.S. 71, 25 L.Ed. 950 (1879).
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by so doing to render it valid, it has usually been held that the
shareholders are estopped to challenge the want of power of the
corporation after unanimously assenting," although there is sub-
stantial authority to the contrary. 9 However, a single dissenting
shareholder may urge the invalidity in a proper case.10
In jurisdiction in which an ultra vires transaction is con-
sidered to be one legal in its inception but beyond the authority
of the corporation to perform," the approach is different. Here
the assent of the shareholders will bind the corporation, and the
effect is the same as if the transaction had been duly authorized
in the first instance.12 The assent must be unanimous;' 8 hence, the
transaction may be enjoined by a dissenting minority sharehold-
er.14 It follows logically that since majority shareholders have
no power to do an ultra vires act initially and by so doing bind a
dissenting minority shareholder, they have no power to ratify
8. Perkins v. Trinity Realty Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 723, 732, 61 AtI. 167, 170
(1905), where the court pointed out, "To permit stockholders of a corpora-
tion to unanimously make a disposition of the corporate property where no
one else's rights are in any way prejudiced, and afterwards to repudiate
their action upon the ground that it was beyond the power of the fictional
body to do the act, could serve no useful purpose, and would be merely
available in aid of fraud," Gallup v. Pring, 108 Colo. 277, 116 P.(2d) 202
(1941); Lawson v. Woodmen of the World, 88 Utah 267, 53 P.(2d) 432 (1936).
9. See Savannah Ice Co. v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 12 Ga.
App. 818, 79 S.E. 45 (1913); Piedmont Feed & Grocery Co. v. Georgia Feed
& Grocery Co., 52 Ga. App. 847, 184 S.E. 899 (1935); Thomas v. Railroad Co.,
101 U.S. 71, 25 L.Ed. 950 (1879).
10. Von Arnim v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass. 515, 74 N.E. 680
(1905); Schwab v. E. G. Potter Co., 128 App. Div. 36, 113 N.Y. Supp. 439
(1908). See 13 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (perm. ed. 1931) § 5823.
11. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 12, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1092, I], where it
is said that a corporation "shall have the capacity to act possessed by
natural persons, but such corporation shall have authority to perform only
such acts as are necessary or proper to accomplish its purposes as expressed
or implied in the articles or that may be incidental thereto, and which are
not repugnant to law." See also 9 U.L.A. 92 (perm. ed. 1942).
12. Lake Park Development Co. v. Paul Steenberg Const. Co., 201 Minn.
396, 401, 276 N.W. 651, 654 (1937), where the court said, "Stockholders of a
corporation may by their unanimous consent, either by direct act or ac-
quiescence, invest officers of the corporation with general corporate powers
involving ubtra vires acts and appropriation of corporate assets to noncor-
porate purposes, where, as here, rights of creditors and violations of law
are not involved, so that all acts done within the scope of such powers are
the acts of the corporation, binding upon it and the stockholders." Collins
v. Hite, 109 W. Va. 79, 153 S.E. 240 (1930).
13. See Schwab v. E. G. Potter Co., 194 N.Y. 409, 87 N.E. 670, affirming
129 App. Div. 36, 113 N.Y. Supp. 439 (1908).
14. Von Arnim v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass. 515, 74 N.E. 680
(1905); Schwab v. E. G. Potter Co., 129 App. Div. 36, 113 N.Y. Supp. 439
(1908); Stevens v. Rutland & Burlington Ry., 29 Vt. 545, 563 (1851), a case
frequently cited with approval, wherein the court pointed out that "in case
of private associations and corporations it is not the doctrine that a majority
[of the stockholders] can bind the minority in a matter beyond and aside
of their original articles of association, or charter of incorporation." See
13 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (perm. ed. 1931) § 5823.
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such an act already done and bind him. Majority shareholders
cannot do indirectly what they cannot do directly. Thus a min-
ority shareholder may enjoin the directors and majority share-
holders from engaging in a line of business which is unauthorized
by the charter, 15 or from ultra vires dealings in stock.16 Similarly
a transaction involving a misappropriation of corporate assets or
the giving away of corporate property 7 may be set aside or en-
joined. It is no defense to the minority shareholder's suit that the
transaction may be beneficial to the corporation and one that
cannot injure the shareholders.'8
Voidable Transactions
Voidable transactions embrace a wide variety of situations
where the directors' action is subject to shareholder rejection or
ratification. The most common type of voidable transaction is
that in which a director votes on a matter in which he has a per-
sonal interest. Such a transaction is voidable, whether it is fair
or not,19 if the interested director's presence was necessary to
constitute a quorum20 or if his vote was necessary to pass the
15. Cherokee Iron Co. v. Jones, 52 Ga. 276 (1874), where the court en-
joined the use of corporate funds to erect a corn and flour mill, the corpora-
tion being incorporated to manufacture pig iron.
16. Dunbar v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 224 Ill. 9, 79 N.E.
423, 115 Am. St. Rep. 132, 8 Ann. Cas. 57 (1906).
17. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 53 S.Ct. 731, 77 L.Ed. 1385, 88 A.L.R. 744
(1933); Lake Park Development Co. v. Paul Steenberg Construction Co.,
201 Minn. 396, 276 N.W. 651 (1937); Jorndt v. Reuter Hub & Spoke Co., 112
Mo. App. 341, 87 S.W. 29 (1905); Pollitz v. Wabash Ry., 207 N.Y. 113, 100
N.E. 721 (1912), affirming 150 App. Div. 715, 135 N.Y. Supp. 789 (1912);
Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138, 51 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 112, Ann. Cas. 1914A 777 (1912), same case 83 Misc. 340, 144 N.Y.
Supp. 801 (1914); Stony Brook Lumber Co. v. Blackman, 268 Pa. 305, 133
Ati. 556 (1926).
18. Davis v. Congregation Beth Tephilas Israel, 40 App. Div. 424, 57 NY.
Supp. 1015 (1899); Central Railroad v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582, 617 (1869), wherein
it was said, "We do not think the profitableness of this contract, to the
stockholders . . . has anything to do with the matter. These stockholders
have a right, at their pleasure, to stand on their contract. If the charters
do not give these companies the right to go into this new enterprise, any
one stockholder has a right to object." See also Byrne v. Schuyler Electric
Manufacturing Co., 65 Conn. 336, 31 Atl. 833, 28 L.R.A. 304 (1895).
19. Burns v. National Mining, Tunnel & Land Co., 23 Colo. App. 545,
550, 130 Pac. 1037, 1039 (1913), wherein the court quoted 10 Fletcher, Cyc.
Corp. (perm. ed. 1931) 790 with approval, as follows: "'A director cannot,
with propriety, vote in the board of directors upon a matter affecting his
own private interest any more than a judge can sit in his own case; and
any resolution passed at a meeting of the directors at which a director
having a personal interest in the matter voted will be voidable at the In-
stance of the corporation or the shareholders, without regard to its fairness,
provided the vote of such director was necessary to the result.'" Carr V.
Kimball, 153 App. Div. 825, 139 N.Y. Supp. 253 (1912); Russell v. Henry
C. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. St. 113, 81 AtI. 136, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 199 (1911).
20. See Curtin v. Salmon River Hydraulic Gold Mining & Ditch Co., 130
Cal. 345, 62 Pac. 552, 80 Am. St. Rep. 132 (1900); Federal Life Ins. Co. v.
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resolution. 21 The reason for the voidability of such a transaction
is manifest. A director stands in a fiduciary relationship to the
corporation 22 and should not be permitted to act where his own
self interest will conflict with the interests of the corporation.
Thus, it has been held that a resolution fixing the salary23 of a
director, or a resolution to purchase land belonging to the direc-
tors, 24 is voidable if the vote of the interested director or direc-
tors was necessary to its passage.
Such possibly self-serving action of the directors may be
ratified by a majority of the shareholders25 voting in a duly con-
stituted meeting, and in the absence of fraud or unfairness the
interested directors may cast their votes as majority sharehold-
ers. 26 If, however, the actions of the directors constitute a fraud27
on the corporation, the majority shareholders cannot bind the
corporation against the vote of a dissenting shareholder.28
Griffin, 173 Ill. App. 5 (1912); Mobile Land Improvement Co. v. Gass, 142
Ala. 520, 39 So. 229 (1904).
21. Hodge v. United States Steel Corp., 64 N.J. Eq. 807, 54 At]. 1, 60
L.R.A. 742 (1903); Carr v. Kimball, 153 App. Div. 825, 139 N.Y. Supp. 253
(1912). But see Nordgren v. Oldham Rural Tel. Co., 40 S.D. 460, 168 N.W.
26 (1918).
22. Bates Street Shirt Co. v. Waite, 130 Me. 352, 156 Atl. 293 (1931); Ben-
nett v. Klipto Loose Leaf Co., 201 Iowa 236, 207 N.W. 228 (1926); Jacobson
v. Brooklyn Lbr. Co., 184 N.Y. 152, 76 N.E. 1075 (1906).
23. Murray v. Smith, 166 App. Div. 528, 152 N.Y. Supp. 102 (1915);
Booth v. Beattie, 95 N.J. Eq. 776, 118 Atl. 257 (1924); Russell v. Henry
C. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. St. 113, 81 Atl. 136, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 199 (1911). But
see McKey v. Swenson, 232 Mich. 505, 205 N.W. 583 (1925); Briggs v. Gilbert
Grocery Co., 116 Ohio St. 343, 156 N.E. 494 (1927).
24. Klein v. Independent Brewing Ass'n, 231 Ill. 594, 83 N.E. 434 (1907);
Bjorngaard v. Goodhue County Bank, 49 Minn. 483, 52 N.W. 48 (1892).
25. Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721, affirming 150
App. Div. 715, 135 N.Y. Supp. 789 (1912); Continental Securities Co. v. Bel-
mont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 112, Ann. Cas. 1914A 777
(1912); Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. St. 113, 81 Atl. 136, 36 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 199 (1911). But see McKey v. Swenson, 232 Mich. 505, 205 N.W. 583
(1925).
26. Bjorngaard v. Goodhue County Bank, 49 Minn. 483, 52 N.W. 48
(1892); Hodge v. United States Steel Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 807, 54 Atl. 1, 60 L.R.A.
742 (1903); Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. St. 113, 121, 81 Atl.
136, 139, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 199, 204 (1911), wherein the court pointed out "that
the resolution of the stockholders ratifying the action of the directors in
increasing the salaries was not invalid because it was done by the votes of
the same individuals by whose votes the resolution of the board of directors
was passed and two of whom were the recipients of the salaries." But see
Smith v. Bunge, 272 Ill. App. 182 (1933). See Comment (1929) 28 Mich. L.
Rev. 181.
27. For an excellent discussion of Shareholder Ratification of Directors'
Fraudulent Acts, see Comment (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1368.
28. Dana v. Morgan, 219 Fed. 313 (D.C. N.Y. 1914); Eshleman v. Keenan,
187 Atl. 25 (Del. Ch. 1936); Klein v. Independent Brewing Ass'n, 231 Ill.
594, 83 N.E. 434 (1907); Brewer v. Boston Theatre, 104 Mass. 378 (1870);
Continental Securities v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912); Godley
v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818, L.R.A. 1915D 632 (1914).
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Illegal Transactions
An illegal transaction is one that contravenes some positive
law, statute or charter, or is against public policy.29 "The courts
sometimes fail to note the difference between ultra vires and il-
legal contracts, and apply the rules relating to the effect of ultra
vires contracts to contracts either expressly prohibited or against
public policy, without in any way noticing the distinction. '30
While it may be said that all illegal acts are ultra vires3' the
converse is certainly not true.
It would appear to be axiomatic that an illegal transaction
entered into by the board of directors cannot be ratified by a
majority of the shareholders3 2 so as to prevent a minority share-
holder from obtaining relief.33 Indeed, there can be no ratification
of an illegal transaction that will render it enforceable.34
No Louisiana cases have been found which have application
to the above situations. It seems likely that the Louisiana courts
will treat an ultra vires transaction as one legal in its inception
and beyond the authority of the corporation rather than one in
which the corporation has no power to perform, in view of Sec-
tion 12, I, of the Louisiana Business Corporation Act. 35 With re-
gard to voidable and illegal transactions, presumably the Louisi-
ana courts will follow the majority decisions of the various com-
mon law state courts, that is, that voidable transactions may be
ratified by a majority of the shareholders and that illegal trans-
actions cannot be ratified at all.
DONALD J. ZADECK
JURISDICTION OVER INTERSTATE HOMICIDES
As a general proposition it is true that the criminal law of a
state has no extraterritorial operation.' In view of the compli-
29. Staacke v. Routledge, 111 Tex. 489, 241 S.W. 994 (1922).
30. 7 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (perm. ed. 1931) § 3582.
31. Eckhart v. Heier, 38 S.D. 524, 162 N.W. 150 (1917).
32. Von Arnim v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass. 515, 74 N.E. 680
(1905); Commonwealth v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R., 111
Va. 611, 69 S.E. 1070 (1911).
33. Forrester v. B. & M. Consol. Copper & Silver Min. Co., 21 Mont.
544, 55 Pac. 229 (1898).
34. Cartwright v. Albuquerque Hotel Co., 36 N.M. 189, 11 P.(2d) 261
(1932); Runcie v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co., 6 N.Y.S.(2d) 616 (1938);
Baird v. McDaniel Printing Co., 25 Tenn. App. 144, 148, 153 S.W.(2d) 135,
138 (1941), in which the court pointed out that "Corporate transactions
which are illegal because prohibited by statute are void, and cannot support
an action nor become enforceable by performance, ratification, or estoppel."
35. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 12, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1092, I].
1. See Marshal v. Nebraska, 6 Neb. 120, 29 Am. Rep. 363 (1877).
State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561 (1856); Beattie v. State, 73 Ark. 428, 84 S.W.
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